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Abstract 
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely 
neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions.  We let subjects playing a linear public 
goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of 
exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly 
learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes.  But despite uniform money payoffs 
implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of 
cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.      
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1. Introduction  
 
An important insight from the last decade of research on the provision of public goods is that the 
problem of voluntary cooperation can be partially resolved by allowing individuals to engage in 
informal sanctions, i.e. in costly punishment of other group members after learning of their 
contributions (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). This insight provides an important stimulus to the 
economic theory of collective action because a preference-based willingness to incur a cost to 
punish free riding can dramatically alter equilibrium outcomes in social dilemma problems, and 
evidence suggests that such a preference-based willingness to punish is widespread (Falk, Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2005). Because of its importance, a burgeoning literature has explored what 
conditions are favorable to making informal sanctions effective.1  
 In contrast, “formal sanctions” — by which we mean the application of sanctions by a 
central authority or by a group acting collectively — have received much less attention in the 
laboratory. 2 This neglect is surprising for at least two reasons. First, centralized punishment 
institutions are widely observed in the real world — consider fines for non-payment of taxes or 
for failing to buy a subway ticket or put the required amount in a parking meter.  By contrast, it 
is difficult to think of real world counterparts to the decentralized monetary punishment included 
in the experiments just mentioned, unless such punishment is thought of as a representation of 
social sanctions like shunning, badmouthing, or ostracism.  Second, formal sanctions may be 
                                                 
1 The effectiveness of informal sanctions and varies greatly, depending on the gains from cooperation, the ratio of 
punisher cost to punishee loss, and the subject population. For example, Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2004) 
have pointed out that earnings are often lower rather than higher when punishment is introduced in experiments 
such as Fehr and Gächter (2000).  By varying the ratio of cost to the punisher versus that to the person targeted for 
punishment, Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2005) shed light on the conditions under which 
the unrestricted opportunity to punish increases efficiency, while Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter (2008) show the 
sensitivity of outcomes to the subject pool. Auxiliary mechanisms such as pre-play communication or sorting by 
subject type are also needed to increase efficiency, in many settings. For experiments that allow communication, see 
e.g. Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (2003), Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006); for sorting by subject type, see 
Gunnthorsdottir, Houser and McCabe (2007), Page, Putterman and Unel (2005).  
2 There is an extensive literature studying incentive-compatible mechanisms in the provision of public goods (e.g. 
Chen and Plott, 1996 or Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter and Winter-Ebmer, 2000). Such mechanisms involve tax (and 
subsidy) mechanisms which can be thought of as formal sanctions in the sense that they are rule-bound. However, 
such mechanisms are often complex and that may also be the reason why they rarely observed “in the wild.” 
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more reliable and equitable. Formal sanctions are rule-bound and are ideally meted out to all 
norm-violators uniformly. They may therefore be thought to deter free riding rather effectively. 
In contrast, informal sanctions often suffer from the “scattershot” nature of unconstrained 
punishing by individuals (e.g. Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman, 2006 and Herrmann, Thöni 
and Gächter 2008), and they may invite retaliation (e.g. Nikiforakis, 2008).3  While the 
effectiveness of informal sanctions depends on the presence and incidence of social preferences, 
individuals interested solely in their own monetary payoff can in principle agree to use formal 
sanctions in order to eliminate free-riding incentives and achieve a Pareto-superior outcome. For 
example, Tyran and Feld (2006) let subjects vote to implement severe sanctions that effectively 
eliminate the free-rider problem and found that the large majority of groups vote for such 
sanctions and comply with them.  
 This paper provides the first study to investigate whether groups left to themselves and 
given no external guidance choose efficient formal sanctions by voting. A possible reason why 
this question has not been studied previously is that the issue is trivial from the perspective of 
the rational actor paradigm. When given the choice between an efficient scheme, i.e. one that 
effectively deters free riding, and a scheme without any sanction, i.e. one where full free riding 
is optimal, rational and self-interested voters will vote for the efficient sanction (see, for 
example, Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). The reason is that a rational, self-interested player 
compares his or her payoff without sanction (the full free-riding outcome) with the outcome with 
efficient sanctions (i.e. cooperation at the efficient level by all players). However, mounting 
experimental evidence suggests that such equilibrium predictions often fail because the 
assumptions needed to deduce them are not necessarily met for all players in practice. In 
particular, many people cooperate to some extent even when material incentives are stacked 
                                                 
3 In his Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689), John Locke wrote: “In the state of nature ... resistance many 
times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.”   
 3
against cooperation, because they have pro-social preferences.  At the same time, some players 
free ride even when it is not in their material interest, perhaps due to bounded rationality or for 
ideological reasons.  
Alternative preferences or bounded rationality might either strengthen the prediction of 
voting for efficient formal sanctions or cause it to break down. First, while subjects having 
preferences for cooperation (such as the conditional cooperators identified by Fischbacher, 
Gächter and Fehr, 2001) can be expected to favor efficient penalties, and in that respect may be 
no different from the maximizers of own payoff assumed by standard theory, individuals 
inclined to punish free riders at personal cost might pick up on the desirability of centralized 
penalties directed at free riders more quickly than do payoff-maximizers, because emotion might 
aid cognition.4  Second, and in contrast, the kind of individuals found to engage in what 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) call “perverse” and Herrmann et al. (2008) call “anti-social” 
punishment in experiments with informal sanctions may prefer to work against group efficiency 
by voting to have high rather than low contributors be penalized.  Third, some individuals may 
oppose formal sanctions out of an ideological or other dislike of “coercive” measures.  To 
investigate the possible influences of bounded rationality, cooperative orientation and ideology 
on voting, our design includes tasks generating measures of intelligence, conditional willingness 
to contribute to a public good, and political views. 
 In addition to providing a first experimental study of choice among formal sanction 
schemes, our paper also contributes to a recent stream of literature on endogenous formation of 
institutions. Several recent experiments have given subjects the opportunity to choose between 
allowing or not allowing informal sanctions (Botelho, Harrison, Rutström and Costa-Pinto, 
2005; Ertan, Page and Putterman, 2009) or rewards (Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, forthcoming) 
                                                 
4 See Damasio (1994).  Evidence that cognitively difficult problems are more easily solved when the decision-
maker is focused on detecting violations of social norms is presented by Cosmides and Tooby (1992). 
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either by voting (the previous papers) or by choice of group (Gürerk, Irlenbusch and 
Rockenbach, 2006).5  In those papers, the vote is about whether to permit informal sanctions 
(rewards), leaving the decision on whether to punish (reward) in the hands of each individual.  In 
this paper, we permit voting choice over a menu of rules under which sanctions are automatic 
once voted upon and triggered by the relevant contribution behavior. Although the impact of 
formal sanctions has been studied previously, no paper has studied voting choice over multiple 
dimensions of the sanction scheme, as in our design.   
 The choices confronting our subjects, after initially facing a standard linear voluntary 
contributions mechanism (VCM) with homogeneous endowments, are (a) whether contributing 
to the public or to the private account is subject to a penalty, (b) what (if any) level of 
contribution to the account in question is exempt from penalty, and (c) the maximum amount of 
the penalty.  Together, (b) and (c) determine the penalty rate per unit contributed to the public 
account or the private account once the exempt contribution is exceeded.  We study subjects’ 
abilities to select efficient schemes over the course of multiple votes and multiple sets of 
contribution decisions.  We also conduct a baseline VCM treatment without voting or penalties 
in order to compare behavior and its evolution over time for the same group size, return from 
public account, instruction phrasing, number of interactions, and subject pool. 
 Our main findings are that most groups in the treatment with voted penalty schemes learn 
to choose parameters that induce efficient outcomes, whereas in the baseline treatment 
contributions decay over time in the usual fashion. Analyzing votes on scheme parameters, we 
find that intelligence and cooperative orientation are significantly positive predictors of more 
efficient choices, while politically conservative or anti-incentive beliefs, and female gender, are 
significant negative predictors of such choices.  We also find impacts of intelligence, 
                                                 
5 Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl (2008) also study choice of institutions in a public goods setting, but in a design 
involving neither formal nor informal sanctions. 
 5
cooperative orientation, and political outlook on contributions to the public good, although they 
are muted or disappear when penalties are in place.  We conclude that while standard theoretical 
reasoning need not lead us astray about the choice of efficient sanction schemes, designing good 
institutions requires experience, and such institutions may fail to emerge in populations having 
less cognitive sophistication or more aversion to the use of penalties to achieve social goals. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides details of the experimental 
design and theoretical predictions.  Section 3 reports our results.  Section 4 provides a summary 
discussion and conclusions.  An Appendix, providing supporting material, is available on-line. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Predictions 
In the linear VCM that is the core of our experiment, a subject is assigned to a group, provided 
with a fixed endowment each period, and asked to make a series of decisions on the allocation of 
that endowment between a private and a public account. His/her payoff per period is given by 
  groupainiall iigroupainiall ii G)GW(GC           (1) 
where W is the uniform per-period endowment, Ci is subject i’s contribution to his or her private 
account, Gi is i’s contribution to the public (or group) account, and 0 < α < 1 is the marginal per 
capita return (MPCR), the domain of which makes it privately optimal to set Gi = 0 but socially 
optimal to set Gi = W.  
 Our experiment has two treatments.  In the BASELINE treatment, subjects play the 
standard linear public goods game for 24 periods in fixed groups. In the endogenous PENALTY 
treatment, subjects vote on a scheme consisting of two elements. First, they decide whether to 
assess fines on contributors to private accounts or to the public account.  By this decision, they 
determine whether it is low or high contributors to the public account that are fined.  Second, 
they vote on the penalty structure, which determines the strength of the sanction and its domain 
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(what, if any, contributions are exempt from fines).  As in BASELINE, each subject plays a total 
of 24 contribution stage games in fixed groups.6 We chose groups of five in order to induce free-
riding problems, make cooperating without communication or fines a serious challenge, and 
avoid tied votes.  We set the endowment per period at 20 points (28 points = 1 dollar) and the 
MPCR ( in equation (1)) at 0.3.   
 The penalty structure is a linear function with two parameters: maximal penalty 
(described to subjects as “fine”) level, a, and penalty-free (equivalently “exemption”) level, b. 
Consider the case in which it is contributing to the private account that gives rise to a penalty 
(see Figure 1.a).  If a subject contributes nothing to the public account, she has to pay a. If she 
contributes more than b to the public account, she pays no penalty.  For each unit assigned to the 
private rather than public account, beyond the exemption, she is fined a/b.   
Although it would damage efficiency, subjects can also elect to penalize group members 
for contributing to the public account, in which case the chosen b is the amount that can be put in 
that account without facing a penalty and a is the maximum penalty that the subject pays should 
she choose to contribute her full endowment to the account (see Figure 1.b).  Less-than-
maximum fines are levied for intermediate contribution levels, as shown by the values lying on 
the line segments labeled ab in the two figures.  
[Figure 1] 
 In the PENALTY treatment, the first four periods are identical to those in the 
BASELINE treatment, that is, without fines.  A voting opportunity is then provided after the 
fourth period and again every four periods thereafter. We refer to a set of four periods as a 
“phase,” the experiment session being composed of six of these, five of which are governed by 
                                                 
6 In both BASELINE and PENALTY treatments, before the start of the contribution game, subjects are clearly 
informed that the session ends in exactly 24 periods. 
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voted rules in the PENALTY treatment.  Voting occurs privately and without opportunity for 
communication, in the following order:   
1. Vote on whether “private account” or “public account” contributions can be penalized; learn 
group outcome (the option receiving a majority of votes); 
2. Vote a maximal penalty level a; learn group outcome (the median a value voted for); 
3. Vote a penalty exemption level b; learn group outcome (the median b value voted for). 
Subjects learn vote outcomes but not how many voted for them or what the individual votes 
were.  Subjects can choose to have no penalty by voting to set a = 0 or, when contributions to 
the private (public) account are penalized, setting b = 0 (20).  To control for a “restart effect” 
(Andreoni, 1998), play in the BASELINE treatment is also conducted as a set of four-period 
phases punctuated by pauses and announcements that another four periods under the same rules 
will begin.7 
 The penalty possibilities are kept simple to facilitate subjects’ comprehension and to 
allow votes to be taken relatively quickly.  Nonetheless, the voting task facing our subjects is 
considerably more complex than in existing experiments that permit only an up-or-down vote on 
a pre-arranged scheme.  Instructions (included in the Appendix) are neutrally worded, with no 
hint as to what it might be desirable to penalize, at what level, or why one might want fines.  A 
subject participated in one treatment only and was not informed about the existence of the other 
treatment.8 
                                                 
7 In both treatments, subjects are told at the outset that there will be six phases of four periods each, that the initial 
instructions cover the first four periods, and that there will be additional instructions before the next phase.  Subjects 
thus have exactly the same information in periods 1 – 4 of the BASELINE treatment as in the corresponding periods 
of the PENALTY treatment.  Throughout both treatments, their understanding is that there may be some new 
information, rule or procedure introduced in the instructions for the next four periods.  With the exception of the 
break between Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the PENALTY treatment, the information at each break is that the next phase 
will have the same number of periods and follows the same rules as the previous one. 
8 One question the reader might pose is why we have groups selecting exemption and fine levels rather than simply 
mandating a required contribution.  One reason is that real-world tax systems couple required tax payments with 
penalties for non-compliance.  Also, we wanted to study subjects’ choice of what to penalize over a space of options 
resembling that available in the decentralized or informal sanctions literature. 
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Before the main part of the experiment, we elicited conditional contribution schedules 
(see Figure 2 for the time line).  We asked each subject to choose his or her contribution level to 
a public account conditional on 21 possible average contribution levels of other group members 
(0, 1, 2, … , 20).  In order that the responses constitute costly decisions, we announced an extra 
period between periods 1 and 2 in which each group member’s earnings are calculated using the 
unconditional period 1 contribution of four group members and the conditional contribution of 
one randomly chosen member given the average period 1 contribution of the other four.9 
[Figure 2] 
 After period 24, each subject took a short intelligence test consisting of 15 problems.  To 
encourage them to give their best answers, we gave subjects 15 points for a correct response and 
deducted 3 points for an incorrect response. The questions are taken from Séréville and Myers 
(1994) and are based on Raven’s progressive matrices (see the Appendix for an example). As an 
indicator of intelligence, we use the number of correct responses.  We included these questions 
to test whether voting is affected by cognitive ability.  The scores, which we refer to as IQ,10 
also allow us to check whether contributing to the public good is affected by intelligence, and 
how intelligence is correlated with conditional willingness to contribute and political views. 
                                                
Finally, each subject answered a questionnaire consisting of 8 questions about political 
preferences (see Appendix).   We included these questions so that we could test whether political 
views including those regarding the desirability of government intervention influence votes on 
the penalty scheme.11 
 
 
9 Our procedure resembles that used in Fischbacher et al., 2001 and Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming). 
10 The term “IQ” is used loosely by us insofar as the scores may not satisfy some conventions with respect to 
standard deviation and other aspects of the score distribution. 
11 As with any design of this type, one may ask whether the answers to a survey administered after the main part of 
the experiment might be influenced by experience in it.  We believe that any such influence is unlikely to vary much 
among subjects in a given design, so that whatever the influence of the experiment on the survey responses, 
response differences among subjects in a treatment will with some faithfulness reflect differences of political views. 
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Predictions 
 In line with the well-known features of the VCM, in the BASELINE treatment the 
dominant strategy of each stage game is Ci = 20, Gi = 0 and the payoff is 20 for all players. In 
the PENALTY treatment, an individual’s payoff is given by 
  iii pGG   groupainiall3.0)20(       (2) 
 
 
where pi = 
}{ bGi i
G
b
aa 

  I   if contributing to the private account is penalized     
}{20
)( bGi ib
abG 


 I
 if contributing to the public account is penalized   
and  }{}{  bGbG ii  II  is an indicator variable that equals 1 when Gi ≤ b (Gi ≥ b) and 0 otherwise.   
An individual can achieve a maximum payoff of 44 if a = 0, she contributes nothing to 
the public good, and her four teammates contribute their full endowments.  However, if the 
individual assumes that all group members are equally rational and intent on maximizing their 
individual payoffs, she knows that at a = 0, the others will also contribute nothing and her 
earnings will be 20.  Therefore, if she expects to be pivotal in the decision, a rational player 
seeking maximum earnings will vote to penalize contributions to the private account and to set a 
 and b = 20, thus compelling herself and her teammates to contribute Gi = 20 and earn 
30 points.  While there are many subgame perfect equilibria with non-pivotal voting, the 
possibility of errors suggests that the individual would reject these weakly dominated choices in 
favor of the three efficient choices above, selection of which constitutes a trembling-hand perfect 
equilibrium (Selten, 1975).
]20,14(
12 In this equilibrium, each subject earns 30 by contributing Gi = b = 
20 in response to penalty rate (a/b) > 0.7, and no fines are in fact paid. Note that these choices of 
a and b implement the efficient allocation. 
  
                                                 
12 The fact that group members have no opportunity to communicate makes estimating the likelihood of being 
pivotal exceedingly difficult, providing an added rationale for selecting the weakly dominating alternatives.   
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 Although a rational, self-interested subject who believes others to be the same will 
always vote for the parameters indicated, experimental subjects may not vote this way for at 
least three reasons.  First, some subjects may fail to understand the mechanism and may vote in 
error for penalizing contributions to the public account, for setting a low b, or for a low a.  
Second, subjects may prefer to indulge ideological or social tastes even at some cost in terms of 
potential income; for example, an aversion to fines and/or to being “coerced” by fines into 
contributing to the public good may motivate some to vote for a = 0, and individuals with such a 
mindset may also vote for penalizing contributions to the public account in order to deter others 
from introducing a contribution-inducing penalty scheme.  Finally, differences in cooperative 
orientation may affect voting, for instance the type of subject seen to punish high rather than low 
contributors in public goods experiments with informal sanctions—a type usually associated 
with free riding at the contribution stage—may also vote for penalizing contributions to the 
public rather than the private account.  In contrast, high contributors in voluntary contribution 
settings, who do most of the punishing of free riders in informal sanctions experiments (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2008),  should be at least as inclined as are their perfectly self-
interested counterparts to impose high penalties on free riders by choice of a formal sanction 
scheme. 
   
3. Results 
Our experiment was conducted at a computer lab at Brown University in June and July, 2009, 
using undergraduate subjects drawn from the full spectrum of fields.13 As summarized in Table 
1, forty subjects in eight groups with five subjects each participated in two sessions of the 
BASELINE treatment and the same number in eight groups in two sessions of the PENALTY 
                                                 
13 9 out of 80 subjects listed their major as Economics, similar to the proportion in the university’s undergraduate 
population as a whole.  Others study a broad range of fields, from the humanities to the sciences. 
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treatment.14 The average earnings of subjects were $28.52 and $32.85 (including a $5 show-up 
fee and an average of $3.54 from the IQ portion) in the BASELINE and PENALTY treatments, 
respectively.   
[Table 1] 
3.1 Characteristics of contributions, earnings, and voting 
Contributions and earnings 
Figure 3.a shows that contributions in BASELINE, i.e. absent any penalty, conform closely to 
those seen in the literature: average contributions begin at around 40% of the endowment and 
decline over time,15 with clear “restart effects” evident in periods 5, 9, 13, 17 and 21.  The trend 
is similar in the PENALTY treatment during periods 1 – 4, when no fines existed.16  Average 
earnings parallel average contributions.17 
 
Result 1.  When formal sanctions are not available by design, average contributions and 
earnings replicate the standard pattern, beginning around 40% of endowment and declining 
with repetition. 
                                                 
14 Twenty subjects took part in each session. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups, and thus, could not 
identify which others present were members of their own group.  Anonymity was further preserved in that subjects 
could not associate contributions with specific others in their group. No communication was permitted between 
subjects. Participants were recruited from the general student population using the BUSSEL (Brown University 
Social Science Experiment Lab) on-line recruitment tool and the experiment was programmed in z-tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
15 The stylized summary of previous VCM experiments is that subjects contribute around 40 - 60% of their 
endowments to the public account in the first period (Ostrom, 2000), with the exact level depending in part on the 
MPCR and group size (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984; Isaac, Walker and Williams, 
1994).  Since we use a relatively low MPCR, average 1st period contributions near the lower end of the stated range 
are to be expected. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test reveals that the average contribution in periods 13 – 24 at the 
group level is weakly significantly different from that in periods 1 – 12 (p-value = 0.093 < 0.10, 2-tailed), 
confirming the declining trend.     
16 The average period 1 contribution of 7.9 in BASELINE treatment and 6.5 in PENALTY treatment are not 
significantly different according to an individual-level Mann-Whitney test (p-value = 0.313, 2-tailed).  A Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test using group-level observations from the PENALTY treatment reveals that the average 
contribution in periods 1-2 and that in periods 3 – 4 are significantly different, with p-value = 0.0497 < 0.05 in a 2-
tailed test, confirming the apparent declining trend. 
17 As can be confirmed from equation (1), group average earnings are a monotonic transformation of average 
contribution to the public account when there are no fines.   
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[Figure 3] 
Voting 
In the PENALTY treatment, the large majority of votes by individuals — 89% — were cast in 
favor of penalizing contributions to the private rather than the public account.  Table 2 reports 
the voting outcomes at group level and shows that only two votes (the 4th and 5th votes by Group 
13) resulted in a majority for punishing contributions to the public account. The proportion of 
individuals voting to penalize private rather than public account contributions rises from 80% in 
the first vote to 90% or more in each subsequent vote, although showing no clear trend during 
votes 2 – 5 (See Appendix Figure B.1). 
 Turning to the choice of a and b, Table 2 shows that optimal parameters were chosen by 
all but one group in the last three of five votes, with two setting optimal parameters in votes 2 – 
5 and two achieving optimal settings in all five votes.  Choosing an efficient penalty scheme was 
not automatic, however, as shown by Group 13’s difficulty agreeing on high a and high penalty 
rate a/b. After experiencing low a/b and lower earnings than it had achieved in Phase 1 during 
Phases 2, 3 and 4, this group chose in its 4th and 5th votes to penalize contributions to the public 
account, further exacerbating a deteriorating trend in its members’ contributions.18  In spite of 
this outlier group, the overall tendency is for a and b to increase with successive votes, 
suggesting learning. 
[Table 2] 
Result 2.  In the PENALTY treatment, there is almost uniform support for penalizing 
                                                 
18 Since only one of eight groups failed to construct an efficient penalty scheme, we checked to see what about 
Group 13’s composition was distinctive.  We found that in the eight PENALTY treatment groups, the number of 
female subjects has observed values 1, 2, 3 and 4, each characterizing two groups.  Group 13 had four female 
members, placing it at the high end of the distribution.  Also, the members of group 13 were 2nd lowest among the 
eight groups in terms of members’ average IQ scores, which is 7.2 in Group 13 and 8.35 on average in the 
PENALTY treatment.  Group 13’s members did not have unusually conservative political ideology nor did it 
contain an unusually large number of subjects classified as free riders or “other” (the latter classification being 
treated as a possible indication of confusion in Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming)). 
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noncontribution to the group account, and voters in most groups quickly learn to choose 
optimal sanctioning schemes.  
 
In spite of failure to achieve optimal penalty rules in some sets of periods and especially in one 
of the eight groups, Figure 3 shows that average contributions in the PENALTY treatment were 
considerably higher in periods 5 – 24, when penalty schemes operated, than in periods 1 – 4, 
when they did not.19  Notably, Figure 3 shows that once voting began and contributions to the 
private account were selected for penalization in all but one group, the average contribution in 
the PENALTY treatments rose, reaching the full endowment during the last three phases in the 
seven successful groups,20 as compared to the declining trend in the BASELINE treatment and 
other VCM experiments.  Both contributions and earnings are significantly higher in the 
PENALTY than in the BASELINE treatment in periods 5 – 24, and the median contribution 
over all groups in periods 5-24 is 0 in BASELINE treatment versus 20 in PENALTY.21 
 
Result 3.  The chosen penalty schemes increase contributions immediately, and contributions 
are sustained or rise with repetition in the PENALTY treatment.  Contributions and earnings 
are significantly higher when there is an opportunity to vote on formal sanctions than when 
that opportunity is absent. 
                                                 
 19 Dividing the data of the PENALTY treatment into periods 1 – 4 and 5 – 24 and comparing the average 
contribution of each group in the two sets of periods, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests confirm that they are 
significantly different, with p-value = 0.017. Period-by-period contribution averages at the group level reveal that 
all PENALTY treatment groups except Group 13 registered strong increases in contribution levels after the first 
vote; see Appendix Table B.1.   
20 In these groups, 419 of 420 contributions decisions in phases 4, 5 and 6 were to contribute exactly 20, with the 
remaining decision being a contribution of 19.  That contributions rose over time during the phases under voted 
penalties is shown by the fact that a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test finds average contribution in periods 5 – 8 is 
lower than that in periods 21 – 24, using group level observations, with p-value 0.025. 
21 We performed Mann-Whitney tests using group-level average contributions in periods 5 – 24 for PENALTY 
versus BASELINE treatment groups, obtaining a p-value of  0.0063 < 0.01 in a 2-tailed test.  Mann-Whitney tests 
using group level average earnings for periods 5 – 24 also find earnings in the PENALTY treatment significantly 
different from those in the BASELINE treatment, with a p-value of 0.0063 < 0.01 in a 2-tailed test. For the median 
contributions, see Appendix Table B.1. 
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 Further evidence that the higher contributions to the public account in the PENALTY treatment 
are attributable to groups’ penalty choices comes from analyzing individual-level decisions with 
multi-variate regressions.  We estimate random effects Tobit regressions22 in which contribution 
to the public account is the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are the penalty per 
unit below the exemption level, a/b, the exemption level b itself, IQ, the vote number (v = 1, 2, 
…5), which also identifies the phase, and the round (period) number within the phase (= 1, 2, 3, 
4).  We exclude the observations for members of Group 13 during the two phases in which 
contributions to the public account were penalized in that group, since the impact of a and b 
should be quite different with such a penalty regime. We also exclude the observations in which 
b = 0 since then a/b = ∞.23  We note here that the results of this exercise ought properly to be 
treated as provisional, pending investigation of the possible endogeneity of the voted parameters, 
a question we return to at the end of Section 3. 
The results, found in Table 3, show that, regardless of the specification of the regression, 
the higher is the per-unit penalty level and the higher is the exemption level b, the more did 
individuals contribute to the public account, effects that are highly significant.   To test whether 
the impact of higher penalty levels depends only on whether penalty rate a/b reaches the 
threshold level of 0.7 per unit, we also estimate regressions (shown in columns (4) – (6)) 
substituting for a/b the dummy variable “Binding.”24  The results indicate that the threshold 
                                                 
22 All of our regressions that include multiple observations for given subjects need to be interpreted with caution, 
since these observations are not strictly speaking independent.  We use Tobit regressions for contribution decisions, 
since these are potentially censored at 0 and 20.  We use random effects estimates (using the xttobit command in 
Stata) because a sufficient statistic allowing fixed effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood of a Tobit model 
does not exist. 
23 We thus exclude the 40 observations of subjects in groups 10 and 14 in Phase 2, during which b = 0. To check the 
sensitivity of our regression results to this exclusion, we also estimated variants of the regressions including an “a/b 
= ∞” dummy variable and setting a/b = 0 if a/b = ∞, instead of dropping the observations.  These regressions 
produce highly significant positive coefficients on the added dummy variable and little change in other coefficients 
or their significance levels.  Results are omitted to conserve space. 
24 “Binding” = 1 if a/b ≥ 0.7, otherwise “Binding” = 0. 
 15
dummy variable has at least as much explanatory power as the continuous variable a/b.  Vote 
number has significant positive coefficients, indicating that contributions are rising from phase 
to phase, even after controlling for the penalty parameters, while round within phase has 
significant negative coefficients, a finding that Figure 3 suggests is attributable mainly to the 
downward trends within Phases 2 and 3, during which some groups had not yet set a and/or b at 
efficient levels (Table 2).25  The other columns and other variables in Table 3 are discussed 
below.26 
 
Result 4.  Contributions are well predicted by the voted penalty parameters. 
[Table 3] 
 
3.2 Heterogeneous social preferences, voting choice and contribution behavior 
We elicited measures of subjects’ conditional willingness to cooperate, intelligence, and political 
attitudes in order to obtain controls for factors we hypothesized might hamper the choice of an 
efficient sanctioning scheme.  Before using the information thus obtained, we briefly introduce it. 
     
Conditional Contribution Schedule 
Following Fischbacher et al., (2001), we measure subjects’ conditional willingness to voluntarily 
contribute to a public good using their decisions in the “strategy method” portion of the 
experiment.  As Appendix Figure B.2.a shows, our subjects’ decisions closely resemble those of 
the subjects in Fischbacher et al., with quite similar proportions classifiable as “conditional 
cooperators” (50%), “free riders” (31%), “hump-shaped contributors” (14%), and “other” 
                                                 
25 Group 13 alone exhibits downward trends within Phases 4, 5 and 6, and the observations of that group from 
phases 5 and 6 are excluded from the regressions. 
26  To check that our results for a/b, b and “binding” are not dependent on the inclusion of the other regressors 
shown in Table 3, we also estimated regressions excluding all other terms apart from the intercept and period terms.  
Results for the variables discussed above remain largely unchanged. 
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(6%).27 In our regression analysis, we use a more continuous statistic of the contribution 
schedules rather than type dummy variables, which sacrifice degrees of freedom.  We considered 
for this purpose the average conditional contribution and the slope of conditional contribution as 
a function of others’ average contribution.  The two variables are highly correlated in our data 
(as in Fischbacher and Gächter, forthcoming), and average conditional contribution achieves the 
best fit in the regressions that follow.28  The average conditional contribution (ACC) of those of 
our subjects fitting the conditional cooperator criterion is 8.22, that of hump-shaped contributors 
is 4.10, that of free riders 0.01, and that of “other” (not classifiable) 6.49.29   
 
Cognitive Ability Measured by IQ Test  
Appendix Figure B.3 provides a histogram of our IQ measure.  There appears to be ample 
dispersion, making it possible to identify associations between behaviors in the experiment and 
intelligence, should these exist (the standard deviations are 3.32 in BASELINE treatment and 
2.58 in PENALTY treatment). Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject that the IQ scores of the 
subjects in each treatment and in the combined sample are distributed normally. The mean 
(median) IQ measure is 7.28 (7.0) for BASELINE treatment subjects and 8.35 (8.0) for those in 
the PENALTY treatment.30   
  
Political preferences  
                                                 
27 Appendix Figure B.2.b shows the conditional contribution schedule and our classification of it for each subject, 
individually. 
28 When both slope of conditional contribution and average conditional contribution are included in a regression, 
there is a problem of multicolinearity and often neither is significant.  We also performed estimates using the first 
principal component of the two variables and found that the results are almost indistinguishable from those using 
average conditional contribution alone. 
29 On the conditional contribution schedules of each subject in Appendix Figure B.2.b, we also provide the value of 
that subject’s ACC. 
30 The difference in IQ between subjects in the two treatments is significant according to Mann-Whitney but not 
according to Kalmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
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The eight political preference questions asked at the end of the session are taken from the World 
Values Survey.  The first, labeled General, asks the subject to place him/herself on a spectrum 
from 1 for Left to 10 for Right.  The average response in our subject pool was 3.71.  Other 
questions concern whether incomes should be made more equal or whether larger income 
differences are needed as incentives for individual effort (labeled Income); whether government 
ownership of business and industry should be increased or whether private ownership of 
business and industry should be increased (Ownership); whether government should take more 
responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for or people should take more responsibility 
to provide for themselves (Responsibility); whether competition is harmful because it brings out 
the worst in people or is good because it stimulates hard work (Competition); whether hard work 
does not generally bring success or usually brings a better life (Hard Work); whether getting rich 
is always at the expense of others or wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone (Wealth); 
and whether everything is determined by fate versus people shaping their fate themselves 
(Destiny). Although a “more conservative” and “more liberal” answer might appear to exist for 
each question, responses to the different items are far from perfectly correlated, so they cannot 
be viewed simply as alternative measures of one underlying orientation.  Average responses are 
found in part (a) of Appendix Table B.4.31  Correlations between the ACC, IQ, political attitude 
responses and Gender are also shown in the Appendix, in part (b) of Table B.4. 
 
Subject-specific determinants of contributions   
We begin our investigation of whether ACC, IQ, or political orientations are predictive of 
behaviors in our experiment with a further analysis of contribution decisions.  The BASELINE 
                                                 
31 The table also displays the average response to each political preference variable by subject type.  Note that for 
ease of interpretation, we redefine the response on the Ownership, Competition and Hard Work questions as 11 
minus the subject’s response, so that for all items, what is usually considered a “more conservative” response 
obtains a higher value. 
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treatment is a standard VCM not complicated by sanctioning schemes, and Table 4 reports a set 
of random-effects Tobit regressions in which a subject’s contribution in a period in that 
treatment is the dependent variable and ACC, IQ, general political orientation, a female gender 
dummy and the period number (1,2,…,24) are entered as explanatory variables, with alternative 
specifications in which either an IQ*Period interaction term,  an ACC*Period interaction term, 
or both are also included.  A final specification includes also a General*Period interaction term.  
Looking at the results, the coefficients on both ACC and IQ are always positive, both 
reaching weak statistical significance in the last two specifications, which include an 
ACC*Period interaction term and an IQ*Period interaction term.  The estimated coefficients on 
those terms are negative and significant, at the 1% level for ACC*Period and the 10 or 5% level 
for IQ*Period, depending on specification.  These results indicate that more conditionally 
cooperative subjects and higher-IQ subjects contributed more on average but also reduced their 
contributions more rapidly than others.32 Female fails to obtain a significant coefficient,33 and 
period has a significant negative coefficient in the first two specifications that disappears with 
the addition of the interaction terms, suggesting that these account for most of the effect.  
Decline of contributions with repetition is of course a standard finding in VCM experiments 
lacking sanctioning opportunities or other added elements. 
General political orientation obtains a significant negative coefficient when entered 
without a Period interaction in columns (2) and (3).  While its coefficient becomes insignificant 
                                                 
32 The IQ-contribution association may result from the fact that more intelligent subjects are more aware of the 
possibility of fostering cooperation in early periods, given the fixed membership nature of grouping in our design.  
Page et al. (2005) comment on the mimicking of conditional cooperation by more sophisticated pay-off maximizers  
but have no measure of IQ with which to investigate their conjecture.  A meta-analysis of prisoners’ dilemma 
experiments by Jones (2008) finds that experiments conducted at schools whose student populations have higher 
SAT scores are significantly more cooperative.  Burks et al. (2008) find a positive association between individuals’ 
cognitive skills and their tendency to cooperate as first-movers in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game. 
33 A series of experiments have attempted to examine gender differences in the VCM; however, their results haven’t 
generated a clear stylized result, and there exist results demonstrating significantly higher contributions by male 
subjects, significantly higher contributions by female subjects, and ones with insignificant gender differences. See 
Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a survey. 
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when we include the General*Period interaction in column (4), the interaction term itself is 
negative and significant.  Together, these coefficients suggest that more politically conservative 
subjects contribute less to the public good, ceteris paribus, and that their contributions decay 
more quickly than those of other subjects.   
[Table 4] 
 Table 5 reports the same regression specifications as Table 4 but using the pooled 
observations of both treatments for the initial period (columns (1) and (2)) and the initial four 
periods (columns (3) – (6), during all of which no penalty schemes existed in either treatment.34  
The results are qualitatively similar, with highly significant positive partial correlations of ACC 
and IQ with contribution in both the first period and the first phase as a whole.  Apart from the 
greater significance of those two variables, the main difference from the Table 4 results is that 
General political orientation and its interaction with Period are insignificant.  These results 
strengthen the conclusion that the conditional contribution schedule picks up an underlying 
willingness to cooperate and that more intelligent subjects are more likely to attempt to establish 
cooperation in early interactions, with the contributions of both high-ACC and high-IQ subjects 
decaying significantly more rapidly over time. 
[Table 5] 
 We also investigate whether ACC, IQ, General political attitude and gender affected 
contributions when penalty schemes were in effect.  In the regressions of Table 3, which we 
discussed above with reference to the effects of penalty parameters only, all specifications 
include a Female dummy, vote number, and round within phase.  In regressions (2), (3), (5) and 
(6), General is also included, and in columns (3) and (6), we further add ACC and IQ score.  As 
in Tables 4 and 5, gender obtains insignificant coefficients, but now the coefficients of IQ and 
                                                 
34 Recall that the information of subjects in both treatments regarding the nature of the experiment was identical 
until after period 4.  
 20
General are also insignificant.  The insignificant coefficient on ACC as well in the specification 
using “binding” (column (6)) suggests that personal characteristics are unimportant to 
contribution decisions when penalty schemes operate, although ACC does obtain a positive 
coefficient significant at the 5% level when we use a/b instead of “binding” (column (3)).   
 
Result 5a.  When the opportunity to vote on formal sanctions is absent, more conditionally 
cooperative and more intelligent subjects contribute more to the public good but reduce their 
contributions more rapidly. More politically conservative subjects contribute less and reduce 
their contributions more rapidly.  Gender has no effect on contributions, after controlling for 
these factors.   
 
Result 5b. When subjects have the opportunity to vote on formal sanctions, individual 
characteristics have qualitatively similar but weaker effects than when the choice of formal 
sanctions is unavailable. Penalty parameters are the main determinants of contributions. 
 
Voting on PENALTY Schemes 
Each subject had to vote first at each voting stage on whether contributions to the public account 
or to the private accounts should be penalized. Although 38 of the 40 votes by groups (95%) 
came out in favor of penalizing contributions to the private accounts, 10% of individual votes 
cast were for penalizing contributions to the public account. Do intelligence, cooperative 
orientation, and political views help to predict voting, as we conjectured? We estimated Random 
Effects Probit, Probit, and Logistic regressions, shown in Table 6, in which the dependent 
variable is one if a subject voted to penalize contributions to the private account, zero otherwise, 
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and explanatory variables are ACC, IQ, the vote number, gender, and in some specifications 
three political survey responses that contribute to the regressions’ explanatory power.   
In columns (1), (3), and (6), which don’t include the survey responses, only four 
coefficients achieve significance at the 10% level or better.  They are (a) one of the coefficients 
for vote number, which is consistently positive, weakly suggestive of learning, and (b) all three 
coefficients for Female, which are negative, indicating that females were significantly less likely 
to vote to penalize contributions to the private account, and vice versa for the public account. Of 
the political preference responses, we found those to the General political preference and the 
Income and Hard Work questions to be most helpful to explaining subject voting.35  The 
influence of these variables on voting is indicated not only by the fact that all three obtain 
significant coefficients under each of the three regression forms and by the improved log 
likelihood and other summary statistics, but also by the fact that ACC, the coefficient on which 
was positive and insignificant in the simpler specifications, becomes significant at the 5 or 10% 
levels.  The positive effect of ACC means that more conditionally cooperative subjects were 
more likely to vote for the efficient choice of penalizing contributions to the private accounts, 
supporting our conjecture that tastes for cooperation might influence voting on penalty scheme 
parameters even though an efficient penalty scheme is a rational choice for a strictly self-
interested subject.  The answer on the General question obtains negative coefficients, suggesting 
that subjects with more conservative political views voted less often for the efficient scheme, as 
we had conjectured might be the case.  In contrast, the coefficients on the Income (Inequality 
needed?) and Hard Work variables obtain positive coefficients, indicating that not all dimensions 
of conservatism cut the same way—those believing that inequalities are needed to provide 
incentives and those believing that hard work produces rewards are less hesitant to favor 
                                                 
35 Adding other survey responses changed results little. 
 22
penalizing private account contributions in order to achieve an efficient outcome.  IQ obtains 
positive coefficients but these are insignificant in all specifications. 
Interestingly, Female has more significant negative coefficients when the political 
attitude variables are included, meaning that female subjects were less likely to vote for the 
efficient option of fining private account contributions even though females show more 
cooperative orientations in our data (the simple correlation between gender and ACC is 
significant and positive).  Because some votes to penalize contributions to the public account 
may be meant to discourage the imposition of fines altogether,36 a possible explanation of the 
result could be a gender-biased dislike for penalties. 
[Table 6] 
Result 6.  Subjects reporting more conservative general political attitudes are less likely to 
favor penalizing contributions to the private accounts, with political orientation having 
considerable explanatory power.  Subjects with more pro-incentive orientations, belief in the 
importance of hard work for success, more cooperatively oriented subjects, and male subjects 
are more likely to favor penalizing such contributions.  
 
Finally, we turn to the votes on the maximum penalty and the penalty-free contribution 
level.  We estimated Tobit regressions to see whether individual votes on the maximum penalty a 
and on the penalty-exempt contribution level b can be explained by difference in cooperative 
orientation and intelligence, by gender, by learning or experience, and by political views.37  We 
                                                 
36 That is, subjects cannot know while casting their votes between the public and private option that an a of zero will 
be chosen in the impending vote on that ballot item, but they may believe the group more likely to select an a of 
zero if it is contributions to the public account that would be subject to penalty.  
37 The Tobit form is used here since the dependent variables each take a range of values having upper and lower 
bounds that are observed with some frequency. We do not show separate specifications that leave out the political 
variables to save space and because the other coefficients show less change from their inclusion than in Table 6.  
We note that the log likelihoods improve with the inclusion of the political variables, but by a smaller margin than 
in that table. 
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separately estimated one set of regressions for the very first vote, when there was no information 
on how others might vote or what the effect of the policy would be, and a second set for the 
remaining four votes (combined).  Since group members knew what a had been chosen when 
selecting b, the chosen a was added as a control in the regressions for b.38 For the regression 
studying votes 2 – 5, the last voted values of both a and b are controlled, and random effects 
estimators are used.39  Observations for the 4th and 5th votes by members of Group 13 are left out 
since they followed decisions to penalize contributions to the public good, making the impacts of 
the two parameters (a and b) and the incentives to vote for high or low values of each 
incomparable to those facing other groups.  A substitution of one of the three political preference 
variables in the Table 6 regressions was found to add more explanatory power. 
Higher conditional willingness to cooperate, measured by ACC, is a significant positive 
predictor of preferred maximum penalty, a, but not of the penalty-exempt contribution, b.  IQ 
has a significant positive effect on 1st but not later votes on a and also shows no significant 
effects on choice of b.  Cooperative orientation and intelligence thus seem to increase voting for 
more efficient penalty levels in the same manner as they increase contributions to the public 
account, but the effect is absent with respect to the exemption level. 
The coefficients on last-voted a and b indicate persistence and/or consistency where they 
are significant, i.e. (i) a higher a (higher b) in the previous phase is associated with a higher a 
(higher b) now, according to estimates (3) and (4); (ii) for votes 2 - 5 (estimate (4)), groups that 
select more binding penalty levels a in the current period also select higher b’s, usually levels 
that cause penalties to be assessed unless the whole or almost the whole endowment is 
contributed to the public account.   
                                                 
38 This structural model has the potential problem of endogeneity since the chosen a is correlated with the error term, 
and actually we confirmed the high correlation. As one possible resolution to avoid this econometric problem, we 
also estimated another variant of regressions (reduced form) including only vote number variables instead of chosen 
a, and we obtained qualitatively the same result.  In our paper, we report only the result mentioned in the text. 
39 The remarks in footnote 20 apply here as well. 
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The coefficients on the General political preference and Income (Inequality needed?) 
variables have roughly the same pattern as in the regressions for the vote on what to penalize, 
with more generally conservative subjects favoring significantly lower penalties and smaller 
exemptions (allowing larger contributions to the private accounts), but those declaring stronger 
beliefs in the necessity of incentives and inequality favoring stronger penalties and higher 
exemption levels.  For these two variables, five of eight coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level, including one significant at the 1% level.   The Destiny variable, taking a higher value the 
stronger the belief that people can shape their own destinies, has positive coefficients and adds to 
goodness of fit for the 1st vote regressions, but it is itself insignificant in those regressions and it 
makes no contribution and is thus left out entirely in the regressions for 2nd to 5th votes.  Female 
again obtains negative, significant coefficients for the votes on both a and b, when the political 
attitude values are controlled for, suggesting that male subjects were more likely to vote for 
more efficient level of a as well as b, perhaps again because females tend to look less favorably 
on the use of strong penalties. 
[Table 7] 
Result 7.  Subjects with more conservative general political views are less likely to vote for 
high fines and penalty-exemption levels, while subjects with more pro-incentive orientations 
and male subjects are more likely to vote for such levels of the two parameters.  Cooperative 
orientation and IQ are positively associated with choice of maximum penalty. 
 
 We conclude with a brief discussion of an issue raised earlier, in our discussion of Table 
3.  In this section, we’ve used regression analysis to examine first the determinants of subjects’ 
contribution choices and then their votes on penalty scheme parameters.  But if individual 
characteristics explain both contributions and votes for penalty parameters, it may be more 
 25
appropriate to treat the penalty rate (a/b) and exemption level (b) in the analysis of contributions 
as endogenous rather than exogenous variables.   
It turns out to be difficult to address this issue, because the regressions explaining voting 
include observations both of votes for the winning median values and votes for other values of a 
and b.  Possible responses include (a) switching the analysis to group level observations and 
treating the penalty parameters as endogenous in that setting, (b) conducting individual-level 
two-stage least squares analysis with the observations of only those individuals who voted for 
the winning parameters of each phase, and (c) treating group penalty parameters as exogenous 
but adding to the contribution regressions also the parameter values for which the individual 
voted, which can be treated as endogenous.  Approach (b) is closest to the spirit of our analysis 
above, and is helped by the fact that the large majority of individual votes, about 63%, were for 
the winning parameter values, so that sample size falls by only about a third when applying this 
method.  However, when only the two survey measures used in Table 7 but not Table 3 are used, 
those measures fail standard instruments tests and few or no coefficients can be estimated with 
precision in the 2nd stage regressions.  Adding a third, fourth, or even all seven survey measures 
(apart from General political preference) improves the estimates of 2nd stage regression 
coefficients, including those on b and a/b which become positive and significant as in Table 3. 
But the Wu-Hausman and Durban-Wu-Hausman tests still fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
those variables are exogenous, with p-values well above 10% (see Appendix Table B.5).40   
                                                 
40 We also performed estimates following approach (c), adding two new terms—preferred b of individual i and 
preferred a/b of individual i—to specifications (1) – (3) of Table 3, using the full set of individual observations.  
(For a/b we use the value of a selected by the group in the previous step, since i selects b knowing that group 
choice.)  In Tobit estimates, the individual preferred values obtain insignificant coefficients while the group-selected 
values of  b and  a/b obtain positive significant coefficients.  2SLS estimates instrumenting the individually 
preferred values with up to seven survey response measures produced few significant coefficients apart from those 
on group-selected b and  a/b in some versions of the column (2) specification, and Wu-Hausman and Durban-Wu-
Hausman tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exogenous.  
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
We conducted two treatments, one a simple and one a modified voluntary contribution 
mechanism experiment, each having 40 student subjects playing in five person partner groups.  
In one treatment, PENALTY, group members played a standard VCM for four periods and then 
were asked five times, at intervals, to vote on three parameters defining a scheme to penalize 
either contributions to their private accounts or those to the public account.  The other treatment, 
BASELINE, is a standard VCM, adding only periodic breaks at the points where voting occurred 
in the PENALTY treatment.  In the PENALTY treatment, groups almost always (in 38 of the 40 
group votes) chose to penalize contributions to the private accounts, and this choice was 
efficiency-enhancing.  Efficiency-enhancement is demonstrated both within and between 
treatments.  In 30 of the 38 instances in which groups voted to penalize contributions to private 
accounts, the group in question achieved higher contributions (in the same 30 cases, also higher 
earnings) under it than in the initial, penalty-free periods.  In 33 of the 38 instances, the group 
achieved higher contributions (in the same 33 cases, also higher earnings) than did the average 
group in the BASELINE treatment during the same periods of the experiment.  
 Our results indicate that subjects were able to devise efficient or nearly efficient solutions 
to a simple collective action dilemma when presented with basic tools that could be used to 
effectively resolve but just as easily to exacerbate that dilemma, and with no guidance on a 
proper course of action and no possibility of communication.   Individual confusion and some 
departures from efficient voting existed, but those tendencies were usually overridden at the 
group level.   
 In addition to the core contributions and voting portions of our experiment, we elicited 
proxies for conditional willingness to cooperate, intelligence, and political orientation.  We 
found that not only do the cooperativeness data have predictive power with respect to 
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contributions in the public goods decisions, but also cognitive ability and political orientation, 
not previously considered in this context, help to predict these decisions.  As expected, more 
conditionally cooperative subjects initially contributed more but also reduced their contributions 
more rapidly over time, in the BASELINE and penalty-free periods of the PENALTY treatment.  
An interesting finding is that while IQ and conditional cooperation are negatively correlated in 
our subject pool, higher IQ subjects also initially contribute more and then reduce contributions 
more rapidly, perhaps because they are more likely to see strategic value in encouraging 
contributions in early periods.  Subjects who self-classified as more politically conservative 
tended to both contribute less and to reduce their contributions more rapidly.  
The main purpose of our study was to see whether individuals provided with no guidance 
on the matter and no opportunity to communicate would recognize the nature of the social 
dilemma posed by a voluntary contribution mechanism and would fashion three available 
parameters, by voting, into a penalty scheme capable of efficiently resolving the dilemma.  We 
were interested not only in the implicit cognitive challenge posed by our PENALTY treatment, 
but also in the possibility that despite the fact that the efficient parameters are in the interest of 
all who focus on maximizing their money payoffs, other preferences might also influence voting.  
Our main findings are that most subject groups were able to select efficient parameters after 
short learning periods.  Nonetheless, preferences besides those for money earnings do appear to 
have influenced voting.   
Consistent with our anticipation of a cognitive challenge, more intelligent subjects 
tended to vote for more efficient parameter settings, but the difference was only significant in the 
first vote for the maximum penalty.  With respect to tastes, we conjectured that those with tastes 
for cooperation, indicated by greater conditional willingness to contribute to the public good, 
would be more likely to vote for efficient penalty parameters, much as high contributors are the 
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most likely punishers of free riders in informal sanction experiments.  This conjecture was 
largely supported.   
We also wondered whether subjects’ ideological orientations, which might touch on 
freedom from interventions or penalties, would help to explain their votes.  This turned out to be 
so.  Despite the availability of an intervention capable of resolving the free-riding problem 
inherent in the VCM, more politically conservative subjects voted significantly less often for 
efficient penalty parameters.  Strength of belief in the need for material inequalities and 
incentives was also associated with voting for efficient penalty variables, even though such 
beliefs are sometimes associated with conservatism.  Interestingly, female subjects, although 
more cooperative in the VCM and conditional cooperation task, voted for significantly less 
efficient penalty parameters after controlling for these other factors, perhaps because of a 
correlation between female gender and reluctance to impose penalties.41 
Our study extends the recently opened field of investigation of choice of sanctioning 
institutions in collective action dilemmas from the domain of informal sanctions to that of 
formal ones.  As pointed out at the outset, formal sanctions may be preferred to informal ones in 
many settings because of their greater predictability and the greater control they afford over anti-
social (or for that matter confused) individuals.  Ours is the first study in which subjects are not 
simply offered the choice of a well-designed sanction scheme, but have to construct one for 
themselves by voting on simple components without communication.   
Directions for future research are numerous.  One obvious extension would be to 
investigate choices between formal and informal sanctions when both are on offer.  Another 
                                                 
41 Although our findings are based on the decisions of just 80 undergraduate subjects at one university, they are in 
most respects consistent with findings in pilot sessions conducted with 70 subjects at the University of Copenhagen 
in early 2007.  There, too, most groups learned quickly to choose efficiency-inducing parameters in the PENALTY 
treatment, whereas contributions showed the usual decaying trend in the BASELINE treatment.  There, too, 
expressed political views were the strongest predictors of voting, with subjects showing more conservative political 
orientations being significantly less likely to vote for penalizing contributions to the private accounts and for setting 
high penalty rates.  
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would be to investigate more complex choice environments, for example ones in which the 
social optimum lies at the interior rather than the boundary of the choice set.  Third, either 
sanctioning or voting or both could be made costly.  The last possibility links up to the critical 
point that whereas in our experiment, the channels and implementation of democratic rule are 
granted to subjects as a free gift of the experimenters, in the real world such institutions must be 
constructed and renewed continually by organizations and societies that are to function 
effectively.  It is also related to the realization that both informal and formal sanctions have costs 
and benefits that require careful assessment when designing actual institutions.     
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Figure 1: The penalty structure 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments, sessions, and subjects 
 
Treatment Total number 
of sessions 
Total number 
of groups 
Group 
numbers  
Total number 
of subjects 
 BASELINE treatment 2 8 1 – 8  40 
 PENALTY treatment 2 8 9 – 16 40 
 Experiment as a whole 4 16   80 
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Figure 2: Experimental Design  
(A) BASELINE treatment 
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(B) PENALTY treatment 
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Figure 3: The trends of average contribution to the public account and average earnings 
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Note: The earning in period 1 in Figure 3(b) does not include the earning in the extra period between periods 1 and 2. 
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Table 2: Results of voting choice (account to be fined, a, b and a/b) 
 
Period G  or P 1 a b a/b G  or P a b a/b
5 P 14 20 0.70 P 12 0 infinity
9 P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
13 P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
17 P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
21 P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
Group 9 Group 10
G  or P a b a/b G  or P a b a/b
P 5 20 0.25 P 10 18 0.56
P 3 15 0.20 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
Group 11 Group 12
 
 
Period G  or P a b a/b G  or P a b a/b
5 P 2 10 0.20 P 20 0 infinity
9 P 5 10 0.50 P 20 15 1.33
13 P 3 15 0.20 P 20 20 1.00
17 G 6 5 -0.402 P 20 20 1.00
21 G 10 5 -0.672 P 20 20 1.00
Group 13 Group 14
G  or P a b a/b G  or P a b a/b
P 5 3 1.67 P 20 20 1.00
P 8 3 2.67 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
P 20 20 1.00 P 20 20 1.00
Group 15 Group 16
 
 
 
Notes: 1. G and P refer to the public account (G) and the private account (P) respectively. 
2. Because a/b is the fine per point contributed to the private account when private contributions 
are fined, in this case we list – a/(20 – b), where a/(20 – b) is the fine that would be paid for 
contributing a point to the public account (see equation (2)).  
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Table 3: Determinants of contributions in PENALTY treatment 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Per unit penalty a/b 10.9*** 11.0*** 11.3*** --- --- --- 
 (1.98) (2.01) (2.00)    
“Binding” --- --- --- 23.3*** 23.4*** 23.1*** 
    (2.80) (2.82) (2.78) 
Exemption level b 2.38*** 2.39*** 2.52*** 1.70*** 1.69*** 1.72*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
Conditional Contribution --- --- 0.79** --- --- 0.49 
   (0.32)   (0.36) 
IQ --- --- 0.24 --- --- -0.39 
   (0.49)   (0.59) 
General (Political Preference) --- -0.23 -0.33 --- -0.37 -0.31 
  (0.69) (0.65)  (0.76) (0.74) 
Female -0.43 -0.44 -1.48 2.95 2.87 1.29 
 (2.42) (2.39) (2.33) (2.76) (2.76) (2.84) 
Vote number 3.19*** 3.17*** 2.98*** 2.29*** 2.30*** 2.25*** 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) 
Round within phase -1.34*** -1.34*** -1.33*** -1.86*** -1.85*** -1.86*** 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
Constant -30.4*** -29.7*** -36.6*** -22.6*** -21.2*** -19.9*** 
 (4.95) (5.32) (6.99) (3.42) (4.45) (6.70) 
       
Number of observations 720 720 720 760 760 760 
Log likelihood -559.6 -559.5 -556.4 -576.3 -576.1 -574.8 
Wald chi2 197.1 198.3 200.6 262.4 263.2 262.9 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Notes: 1.  Random effects Tobit regressions. 
 2.  *** indicate significance at the .01 level.  
 3. Vote number {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and Round within phase {1, 2, 3, 4}. 
 4. The dummy variable “binding” equals 1 when a/b ≥ 0.7 and 0 otherwise. 
  5. In columns (1) to (3), observations in which b = 0 are excluded since then a/b = ∞. 
 6. For numbers of left and right censored observations, see the Appendix. 
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Table 4: Determinants of contributions in BASELINE treatment 
 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Conditional Contribution  0.21 0.15 0.42* 0.45* 
 (0.25) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) 
IQ --- 0.42 0.66* 0.71* 
  (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) 
General (Political Orientation) --- -1.58** -1.59** -0.23 
  (0.76) (0.75) (0.83) 
Female --- 2.77 2.82 2.85 
  (2.45) (2.42) (2.45) 
Period -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.17 0.34* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.18) 
ACC*Period --- --- -0.03*** -0.03*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
IQ*Period --- --- -0.02* -0.03** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
General*Period --- --- --- -0.13*** 
    (0.03) 
Constant 4.11** 5.95 2.72 -2.48 
 (1.85) (4.54) (4.67) (4.89) 
     
Number of observations 960 960 960 960 
Log likelihood -1821 -1816 -1812 -1803 
Wald chi2 113.9 121.4 130.4 136.7 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes:  
1. Table shows random effects Tobit regressions.            
2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and the .01 level, respectively. 
3. The number in the parenthesis is the standard deviation. 
4. Period {1,2,… ,24}. 
5. For numbers of left and right censored observations, see the Appendix. 
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Table 5: Determinants of contributions in first period and first phase, both treatments 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conditional Contribution 1.19*** 1.36*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 1.34*** 1.35***
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.20) (0.20) (0.28) (0.28) 
IQ --- 1.05*** --- 0.60** 1.35*** 1.37***
  (0.35)  (0.29) (0.40) (0.41) 
General (Political Orientation) --- -0.61 --- -0.097 -0.10 -0.49 
  (0.63)  (0.51) (0.51) (0.72) 
Female --- -2.35 --- 0.66 0.63 0.62 
  (2.15)  (1.78) (1.78) (1.78) 
Period --- --- -0.94*** -0.94*** 2.61*** 2.13* 
   (0.34) (0.34) (1.10) (1.27) 
ACC*Period --- --- --- --- -0.22*** -0.22***
     (0.08) (0.08) 
IQ*Period --- --- --- --- -0.30*** -0.31***
     (0.11) (0.11) 
General * Period --- --- --- --- --- 0.15 
      (0.20) 
       
Constant -0.20 -5.81 2.60 -2.18 -11.0** -9.79** 
 (1.80) (4.15 (1.59) (3.48) (4.40) (4.68) 
       
 Number of observations 80 80 320 320 320 320 
 Log likelihood -199.0 -193.5 -763.9 -761.7 -755.5 -755.2 
 Wald chi2 20.8 32.0 22.9 27.8 40.0 40.5 
 Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes:  
1. Random effects Tobit regressions. 
2. Observations of first period only, columns (1) and (2), and of periods 1 – 4, columns (3) – (6). 
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and the .01 level, respectively. 
4. The figure in the parenthesis is standard deviation. 
5. Period {1, 2, 3, 4}. 
6. For numbers of left and right censored observations, see the Appendix. 
Table 6: Determinants of voting to penalize contributions to private vs. public account 
 
  
Random Effects 
Probit Probit Logistic 
 Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conditional Contribution 0.08 0.12* 0.05 0.10** 0.10 0.21** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) 
 IQ 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.14 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.12) 
General (Political Orientation) --- 0.39*** --- 0.33*** --- 0.61***
   (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.15) 
 Income (Inequality needed?) --- 0.22** --- 0.19*** --- 0.38***
  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.13) 
 Hard Work --- 0.19* --- 0.15** --- 0.27** 
  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
 Female -0.97* -1.44** -0.62** -1.11*** -1.22** -2.03***
 (0.58) (0.61) (0.27) (0.37) (0.55) (0.69) 
 Vote number 0.18* 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.28 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18) 
 Constant 0.41 -0.46 0.58 -0.27 1.05 -0.72 
 (1.15) (1.10) (0.61) (0.75) (1.13) (1.33) 
       
 Number of observations 200 200 200 200 200 200 
 Log likelihood -57.6 -52.1 -64.3 -54.1 -60.3 -54.2 
 Wald chi2 6.34 12.42 --- --- --- --- 
 LR chi2 --- --- 10.1 30.46 10.0 30.14 
 Prob > chi2 0.175 0.087 0.039 0.000 0.040 0.000 
 Pseudo R2 --- --- 0.073 0.220 0.072 0.217 
 
Notes:  
1. The dependent variable equals 1 if the subject voted to penalize contributions to the private accounts, 0 if s/he 
voted to penalize contributions to the public account.  
2. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
3. The figure in the parenthesis is standard deviation. 
4. Vote number {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
 40
 41
Table 7:  Determinants of votes on a and b 
 
 
 Initial vote 2nd to 5th vote 
Independent Variable (1)  Vote on a 
(2)  
Vote on b 
(3)  
Vote on a 
(4)  
Vote on b 
Conditional Contribution 2.71*** -0.59 1.14* 0.13 
 (0.92) (1.04) (0.66) (0.45) 
IQ 2.75** -0.30 0.40 -0.68 
 (1.27) (1.55) (1.03) (0.73) 
(Last-voted group a) --- -0.52 1.71*** 1.13*** 
  (0.60) (0.37) (0.26) 
Previous group b --- --- 0.31 1.06*** 
   (0.31) (0.24) 
General (Political Orientation) -3.26** -3.84 -3.92*** -1.86** 
  (1.61) (2.46) (1.39) (0.91) 
Income (Inequality needed?) 2.07 2.79 2.33** 1.65** 
 (1.25) (1.86) (1.12) (0.78) 
Destiny 1.15 3.42 --- --- 
 (1.72) (2.47)   
Female -17.0** -17.4* -14.3*** -8.01** 
 (6.46) (8.90) (5.55) (3.83) 
Constant -19.3 7.86 5.21 3.85 
  (17.2) (22.3) (12.0) (8.80) 
     
Number of observations  40 40 150 150 
Log likelihood  -79.8 -77.6 -129.0 -118.7 
LR chi2 20.32 9.28 --- --- 
Wald chi2 --- --- 33.45 37.91 
Prob > chi2 0.002 0.233 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.113 0.056 --- --- 
 
Notes:  1. Tobit regression (columns (1) and (2)) and Tobit regression with random effects (columns (3) and (4)).   
 2. Number in parenthesis is standard deviation. 
 3. * and ** indicate significance at the .10 level and the .05 level, respectively.  
 4. In regression (3), a is the value chosen in the previous vote, while in regressions (2) and (4), a is the value 
    selected in the previous voting step of the current vote process. 
 5. For numbers of left and right censored observations, see the Appendix. 
 
